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Toshikazu
Tateiwa
“Changes of Agriculture, Rural Community and the Welfare
Work of Rural Area in Japan, and Lessons for Asian Countries”
Agriculture and Rural Communities in Japan were changed dramatically
in late 20th century. Number of farm, farmer, and professional
farmer were decreased sharply. And the acreage of farm land decreased
1 million hectors in same period. The usage rates of farm land,
and the rate of agricultural production in Japanese GDP were also
diminished. This trend of reduction in Japanese agriculture is
now in progress. And because of high price of farmland, the scale
of farm management can not increase.
In these conditions, the price of agricultural products downed,
and the rate of self-sufficiency of food in Japan was decreasing
accompanied with increase of food import. The rate of food grain
self-sufficiency was only 29 % and calorie based self-sufficiency
was 40 % at 2002. Nevertheless, the income of farmers was not
decreased because of industrialization in rural area and many
farmers became part-time farmer. And also, Japanese food consumption
became affluent by the import of food.
Accompany with these diminishing of agriculture, the aging and
the depopulation in rural areas in Japan become worse. In the
rural area, recently, welfare works for aged peoples are bore
by the agricultural co-ops. These activities are based on the
human relationship in rural community.
Claus Thomasberger
“Market economy, Self-regulation and Human Freedom”
Polanyi often has been criticised – and not from Marxist
authors
only – that he, accepting the idea that the civilisation
of the
nineteenth century was characterised by the self-regulating market
system, agreed upon the scientific accuracy of liberal economic
theory – at least for that period of history. Focusing on
Polanyi’s writings between 1920 and 1940, his articles about
the socialist accounting (Sozialistische Rechnungslegung), lecture-notes
about functional democracy (including F. Schafer’s doctoral
dissertation), and manuscripts concerning guild-socialist economy,
the paper shows that – and why – Polanyis ideas about
the possibilities and the limits of economic sciences are in contrast
not only to the views of economic liberalism but also to the approach
which after the second world war has become known as Keynesian
theory. In addition, it discusses how Polanyis ideas about economics
are ultimately related with ethical considerations, especially
the problem of ‘freedom in a complex society’.
Judith Trudeau
“La coexistence”
Avec la dualité des mondes au niveau international : le
monde formel axé principalement sur les États ;
les sommets ; les accords les traités, et le monde informel
axé sur tout ce qui est autre : les entreprises transnationales
; les flux monétaires et démographiques transnationaux
; la décentralisation du pouvoir et la multiplicité
des lieux de gouvernance (Badie et Smouth, 1999), certains auteurs
se posent la question : « Y a-t-il de la place pour penser
le bien commun? » Pour Huntington (1997), la division ne
se trace pas en fonction d’une dualité structurelle
(formelle/informelle) mais en fonction des lignes de partage entre
les différentes civilisations qu’il dénombre
autour de 7-8. Ainsi, dans cette approche, c’est la culture
qui devient un obstacle à un projet commun (bien que cet
auteur prenne pour acquis une moralité universelle). Pour
les réalistes hobbsiens, le cadre d’analyse ne permet
pas non plus une pensée plus holiste puisque chaque acteur,
des États dans ce cas-ci, agit toujours en fonction de
ses propres intérêts. Où est donc la place
pour penser une coexistence structurelle, culturelle et territoriale
entre les individus dans le champ de la pensée politique
internationale? Hedley Bull semble avoir très bien saisi
cette faille dans son ouvrage : The Anarchical Society : a Study
in World Politics. L’auteur de cet ouvrage fait la distinction
entre la description d’un ordre international et celle d’un
projet de justice, et constate que l’ordre actuel ne permet
pas un projet de justice viable. Ma question est toute simple
: comment penser la justice internationale si les penseurs axent
leur théorie sur les fractures, sur ce qui divise les humains
plus que sur ce qui les unit?
Le vivre-ensemble est un état de fait. Il reste à
savoir ce qu’on veut en faire. Le monde formel nous offre
des cadres pour gérer le vivre-ensemble : le tribunal pénal
international, l’ONU, le cadre des droits humains…
Il s’agit d’évaluer si cette structure formelle
peut assurer une certaine justice. Parce que parler de justice
implique nécessairement de faire appel à des valeurs,
à des conceptions du monde, à des a priori. Ainsi,
si le vivre-ensemble est un état de fait, la justice n’appartient
pas à cette catégorie sémantique et fait
plutôt partie de ce que Weber appelle le jugement de valeurs.
Le cadre formel doit donc être souple pour permettre la
discussion de ce qui est juste, pour permettre une intersubjectivité
(Cox, 1996).
Si nous prenons l’organisation onusienne, pouvons-nous dire,
même avec toute la légitimité morale qu’elle
détient, qu’elle permet l’émergence
d’une justice représentative? Dans quelles optiques
les missions de paix sont-elles déployées?
Qui intervient? Dans quel but? Quels sont les facteurs de réussite?
Et ceux d’échec? Est-ce pour défendre des
valeurs collectives (cela est-il possible?) ou est-ce pour servir
une logique d’intérêts pure et simple qui institutionnalise
la logique des puissants? (Cox 1992).
Comment des penseurs comme Aristote, Machiavel (celui des Discours
et non pas celui du Prince), Arendt et Taylor peuvent-ils nous
aider à penser le vivre-ensemble de façon différente?
Comment penser la coexistence internationale sans tomber ni dans
la fracture immobilisante, ni dans la naïveté d’extraire
l’intérêt qui semble inhérent à
toute intervention, quelle qu’elle soit?
Gabriela Tunes da Silva and Roberto Bartholo
“Three Roads to Serfdom”
Karl Polanyi has shown us that the Industrial Revolution inverted
the way in which our society is organized: the market, which at
first had been embedded in and regulated by society, has now become
the regulator itself. As the role of the market in society shifted,
people were subordinated to a cold and impersonal logic. They were
now “dispensable atoms”, parts of a great machine to
which they were all condemned to serve. The technical and technological
benefits generated by the Industrial Revolution were, therefore,
not any greater than the harm it inflicted. There can be no justification
for the poverty, humiliation, misery and despair inflicted upon
several generations, all in the name of technical progress. However,
the catastrophe that accompanied the Industrial Revolution is not
taken into account by a great number of thinkers in their economic
and social analyses. In “The Road to Serfdom”, F. A.
Hayek argues that the economic planning defended in some socialist
doctrines leads to the same kind of serfdom present in totalitarian
states (nazism and fascism). Based on this he concludes that the
best, and only way to guarantee freedom is to implement economic
liberalism. Hayek identifies some of the characteristics found in
totalitarian systems, pointing out that socialist states with planned
economies have those very same characteristics. This paper intends
to show that the characteristics described by Hayek as typical of
the totalitarian systems are very present and alive in the modern
day United States. Hence, both economic liberalism and free market
lead to the same serfdom found in totalitarian systems. Polanyi
has shown us that serfdom is not a result of power centralization
or economic planning, but of the very act of submitting people’s
day-to-day life to impersonal systems and mechanisms, no matter
if they are called State or Market. We can thus conclude that there
are several possible roads to serfdom, three of which the human
race has already trailed: the totalitarian, the socialist and the
liberalist.
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